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Introduction
Since Qatar won the hosting rights for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in 2010, recurrent
human rights violations of migrants working on building or refurbishing new
infrastructure for the tournament have been denounced (see the reports by Amnesty
International here and here). As football’s governing body, FIFA should have been
aware of the risk that the organisation of the 2022 World Cup could entail human
rights violations in the country. Despite progress made in these past few years with
regard to the rights of those migrant workers due mostly to international pressure,
infringements such as limitations to the freedom of movement, violations of the right
to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which also entails a
failure to guarantee the right to health, discrimination on the basis of nationality and
restrictions to the right to access justice, still occur.
In this blog, I investigate how a migrant worker could engage the legal responsibility
of the different actors involved in the organisation of the FIFA World Cup 2022. The
main challenges are the lack of regulation of private entities under International
Law, the non-existence of regional human rights courts in Asia and the difficulties
encountered to seek the protection and reparation of the rights violated at the
national level. The respect and protection of human rights can nevertheless only be
guaranteed by the availability of effective judicial remedies.
To prevent the protection of human rights violations suffered by migrant workers to
depend exclusively on the good will of the host State or the home State, I believe
shared responsibility could be a useful framework to ensure a proper reparation to
the victims as well as the accountability of the multiple actors that have contributed
to the violations of migrant workers’ rights in Qatar in the context of the build-up to
the 2022 FIFA World Cup (see SHARES here).
Human rights violations and the 2022 World Cup in
Qatar
The 2022 World Cup in Qatar introduces major novelties: for the first time, an Arab
and Middle East state organizes such a mega-sporting event. Qatar is also the
smallest country per area and population to host the World Cup. The organization
represents a huge logistical challenge and requires a large workforce.
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Since the beginning of the construction works for the 2022 World Cup, claims of
serious violations of the migrant workers’ rights have been recurrent. Under the
Kafala system (Law No. 4 of 2009 Regulating the Entry and Exit of Expatriates, their
Residence and Sponsorship, State of Qatar), the employer (Kafil) was responsible
for the safety and protection of migrant workers. The practices resulting from this
system were considered modern-day slavery and human trafficking, as migrant
workers suffered abusive conditions before, during and after their entry in Qatar as
well as in the construction field with long working hours under extreme temperatures,
low wages (or no wages if the employer decided to withhold large portions of salary
for extra charges), delays in the payment of salaries, physical and psychological
harm and deplorable housing conditions, frequently housed in “workers camps”
without necessary amenities (see here and here).  In fact, human trafficking for
forced labour was the object of a complaint against Qatar filed with the ILO on 12
June 2014 relating to the violation of ILO Conventions Nos. 29 and 8. The labour
reforms introduced by Qatar led to the closure in 2017 of the complaint procedure
under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution.
However, the abolition of the direct employer’s permission to leave the country
does not seem to impair the employer’s capacity to refuse the provision of “non-
objection certificates” which are needed for workers to change jobs before the end
of the contract. Moreover, most of the new labour legislation has not been fully
implemented yet (see the reports here and here) : confiscation of passports and
harsh labour conditions are still a reality in the country; the minimum temporary wage
is insufficient to ensure a proper standard of living (the temporary minimum wage
is of QR 750 – around USD 200 – per month); the law still provides for the need to
get an employer’s “permission” to leave the country for 5% of the workers “due to
the nature of their work”; and, the newly set-up labour courts in charge of judging the
workers complaints are overwhelmed and rather ineffective.
The differentiated responsibilities of FIFA, Qatar and
Switzerland
Qatar, the host state, ratified 6 out of the 189 ILO conventions and the core human
rights treaties (including the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights,
and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Its obligations, under International
Human Rights Law, are to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights. The duty to
protect entails for the state to ensure the protection of individuals against human
rights abuses. Switzerland, FIFA’s home State, is actively engaged and strongly
committed to human rights. Under the ICESCR, the home State is obliged to take
steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations, which have
their main offices under their jurisdiction. General Comment No. 31 of the Human
Rights Committee declares that State parties have the obligation to protect civil and
political rights also against acts committed by private persons or entities. The failure
to take proper measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate
or redress the damage caused by such acts is also a breach of the ICCPR.  
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Despite recent labour law reforms, Qatar’s international responsibility could still
be engaged for human rights abuses on account of the violation of its duty to
protect (among others, the right to work, the right to non-discrimination, the right
to freedom of movement and the right to access to justice). Indeed, the Qatari
Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy is the government agency responsible
for delivering the infrastructure required for the 2022 World Cup (see here and
here). Among other tasks, it selects the main contractors for the construction of the
stadiums.
As Millward notes “corporate building contractors are employed by the sovereign
State of Qatar and then, in most cases, find sub-contractors to deliver their
projects”. Thus, it could be argued that the wrongful actions of the contractors
and subcontractors related to migrant workers on building sites connected to the
FIFA World Cup can be attributed to the State of Qatar due to the failure of one
of its organs (the Supreme Committee) to comply with the state’s human rights
obligations.
While Qatar has the power to exclude contractors that do not respect workers’
human rights because it holds economic (and regulatory) authority over them, FIFA
could also be more proactive in  pushing host countries to live by human rights
standards. Through its bidding process to host the World Cup, FIFA could have
imposed conditions related to the treatment of the workers active on construction
sites and therefore, decided to exclude the candidate countries unable or unwilling
to follow them. Even after winning the bid, the Organizing Association Agreement,
signed between the host country and FIFA, grants FIFA “a pseudo authority inside
national boundaries” by requiring the host State to pass specific national legislations.
FIFA sets forth the list of (technical and other) requirements for the stadiums, the
plans for the construction or renovations of stadiums must be approved by FIFA and
the organization has the right to carry out stadium inspections at its sole discretion
and issue directives based thereon. FIFA can also reject the selection of a stadium
and issue new directives. So, FIFA has some leverage to mitigate and prevent
human rights abuses linked to the organisation of the World Cup or, at the very least,
there are possible ways for FIFA to increase its leverage on the contractors and
sub-contractors. That capacity has been pointed out by FIFA’s own Human Rights
Advisory Board in its Second Report of September 2018.
As mentioned above, Switzerland also has an obligation to take appropriate
measures to prevent, punish, investigate and redress human rights abuses
committed by the entities under its jurisdiction. Although human rights conventions
remain usually silent with respect to extraterritorial application, as FIFA’s home state,
Switzerland has an obligation of due diligence over the activities of its private entities
overseas under the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
Nonetheless, when faced with the claim of Mr. Nadim Shariful Alam against FIFA,
a Swiss civil court dismissed the case (for more details, see the blogs here and
here). Mr. Alam is a Bangladeshi citizen whose passport had been confiscated in
2014 by its employer, making it impossible for him to travel and he was therefore
totally dependent on his Kafil. During his stay in Qatar, Mr. Alam was allegedly
living in a workers camp with 2250 other migrants under miserable conditions.
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Due to the prohibition for migrant workers to join trade unions, he could not ask
for the protection of his rights nor for reparation in Qatar. The claim,  brought by
the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation, the Bangladeshi Free Trade Union
Congress, the Bangladesh Building and Wood Workers Federation and Mr. Alam,
referred to FIFA’s obligation of due diligence and its capacity to promote legislative
and significant change in Qatar. It alleged that:
• FIFA committed a wrongful act by selecting Qatar for the 2022 World Cup
without ensuring the proper protection of the rights of migrant construction
workers;
• FIFA failed to fulfill its obligation to request Qatar to protect migrant workers and
to demand legal reforms;
• Therefore, FIFA violated Mr. Alam rights and had to pay for the damage
resulting from its unlawful actions.
In its judgement of 3 January 2017 , the Commercial Court of the Canton of Zürich
dismissed the claim of Mr. Alam on the motive that the case was not a commercial
dispute that fell within the jurisdiction of the tribunal and that the claim was not
enforceable and specific enough. However, it would have been impossible for the
plaintiffs to bring the case before a Swiss Labour Tribunal due to the fact that FIFA
was not the direct employer of Mr. Alam. The tribunal would certainly have dismissed
his claim (Art. 34 Swiss Code de Procédure Civile). Thus, it seems that Swiss
courts do not have jurisdiction to decide on claims of migrant workers against FIFA
alleging labour rights violations in Qatar connected to the organisation of the FIFA
World Cup. Should the popular initiative to amend the Swiss Constitution become
a reality, private companies will have an obligation, under Swiss law, to respect,
protect and monitor human rights abroad. The new Article 101a of the Constitution
would certainly help to clarify the legal situation and allow Swiss courts to establish
jurisdiction in case of human rights abuses overseas. It remains unclear however
if Article 101a could apply to FIFA’s actions bearing in mind that the organization
has been formally created as an association under Article 60 and seq. of the Swiss
Civil Code (Article 1 FIFA Statutes). With a revenue of 484 million USD and a total
projected investment/expenses of 1108 million USD for 2020 (see here), FIFA is,
for Bean, a “non-listed, economically significant” company or organization under
the Swiss Code of Best Practices for Corporate Governance1)B. W. Bean, “FIFA
– Where Crime pays” in M. Breuer and D. Forrest (Ed.), The Palgrave Handbook
on the Economics of Manipulation in Sports, Palgrave McMillan, Cham, 2018, p.
305.. Should the Constitution be amended, Swiss courts will clarify the scope of
Article 101a. However, that future discussion does not diminish the actual obligation
Switzerland has to ensure to victims access to proper remedies to claim reparation
for human rights violations linked to Swiss corporations or associations (such as
FIFA).
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Towards an effective shared responsibility between
FIFA, Qatar and Switzerland?
In situations of “governance gaps” (multiple actors are unable or unwilling to
effectively protect human rights), shared responsibility might be a useful framework
to better allocate international responsibility among multiple actors. With regard
to the 2022 World Cup, Qatar, FIFA and Switzerland have contributed to a single
harmful and undesirable outcome (systematic abuses of the rights of migrant
workers) that took a variety of forms (discrimination, unlawful restrictions to freedom
of movement, violations of the right to work, the right to health and the right to
be free from forced labor, non-access to justice). However, they did not act as a
collective entity (human right abuses do not result from instructions jointly issued)
and they are not bound by the same obligations (Qatar had a duty to protect human
rights in its territory, Switzerland did not provide access to justice to rights holders
to claim reparations from a Swiss private entity (FIFA), and FIFA failed to exercise
proper leverage before and after the selection of Qatar as the host State of the 2022
World Cup). Nonetheless, each of the actors were fully aware of the consequences
of the lack of prevention and punishment of the recurrent wrongful conducts.
As Qatar and Switzerland are responsible in respect to the same injury, I
believe both of them have the obligation to provide reparation. Furthermore, the
responsibility of each of the states will not be diminished by the involvement of
the other state2)A. Nollkaemper, “Issues of Shared Responsibility before the
International Court of Justice”, in E. Rieter/H. de Waele (Ed.), Evolving Principles of
International Law. Studies in Honour of Karel C. Wellens, Brill/Nijhoff, 2012, p. 205.
(diffusion of responsibility has to be prevented).
With regard to the exercise of jurisdiction, it seems Qatar faces huge difficulties to
properly address the claims of the migrant workers. Thus, the possibilities for migrant
workers to obtain reparation before Qatar’s national courts seem non-existent at
this time. Concerning the jurisdiction of international courts, it is likely that migrant
workers could only be able to access the European Court of Human Rights for
the breach of the due diligence obligation of Switzerland. The absence of regional
human rights courts in Asia leaves only the (highly unlikely) possibility that the home
states of migrant workers  (Bangladesh, Nepal, Philippines, etc.) exercise diplomatic
protection and claim reparation on their behalf before an international court.
It is though more difficult to address a shared responsibility between both States and
FIFA. As mentioned above, no primary rules of International Law are per se binding
on FIFA (despite the breach of its soft law obligation of due diligence). The absence
of any “hard direct corporate responsibility”3)E. De Brabandere, “Non-State Actors
and Human Rights. Corporate Responsibility and the Attempts to Formalize the Role
of Corporations as Participants in the International Legal System”, in J. d’Aspremont
(Ed.), Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on
Non-State Actors in International Law, Routledge, 2011, p. 274. See also C. M.
Bailliet, “What is Become to Human Rights International Order in an Age of Neo-
Medievalism?”, in C. M. Bailliet (Ed.), Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective
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Regimes: From the Margins, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 120-123. entails
that FIFA has no direct human rights obligations under International Law.
Consequently, trying to establish and to hold private entities responsible for human
rights abuses to which they have contributed is exasperatingly difficult. The non-
existence of binding international rules on the matter diverts the discussion towards
state responsibility and highlights the limited possibilities to activate human rights
enforcement mechanisms. Many are the obstacles standing in the way of the
victims. While, the impact of public shaming by NGOs on the reputation of the
actors involved could be significant, much remains to be done in order to ensure the
protection of the migrant workers in Qatar.
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